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Walter Kasper’s Religious Quest for Jesus Christ
Glenn Morrison
The University of Notre Dame, Australia

Walter Kasper brings to light the religious quest for Jesus Christ in a secular,
historical world. Taking up the turn towards anthropology and demythologisation, he
sets out to rationally articulate the logic of faith in which Jesus is recognized as the
Christ. Pursuing this quest, he develops a theological discourse on freedom,
redemption, and self-transcendence.
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T

he quest for meaning and truth pierces both our secular and religious worlds. The
Christian truth of what gives life to our existence and reality, namely, that Jesus is the

Christ, is one that constantly needs to be re-iterated in our increasingly secular and
technological world. This article will focus on Walter Kasper’s ‘Religious Quest for Jesus
Christ’ as a means of renewing the logic of faith for today. To this end, I will use both a
phenomenological and an ontological lens. Accordingly, I will refer, in some instances, to the
philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas, two philosophers in the twentieth
century who have been a major influence on Christian theologians. For the most part, my
exposition and analysis of Kasper’s thought is influenced by the ethical metaphysics of

1

Emmanuel Levinas, which will proffer, if you like, a ‘Levinasian’ reading of Kasper’s
‘Religious Quest for Jesus Christ.’1
At specific instances, Levinas would direct his writings towards Christianity and
theology, so as to draw parallels between his own thinking and Christian life and thought. In
his essay, for example, ‘Philosophy, Justice and Love,’ he writes:

When I speak to a Christian, I always quote Matthew 25; the relation to God is
presented there as a relation to another person. It is not a metaphor: in the other, there
is a real presence of God. In my relation to the other, I hear the Word of God. It is not
a metaphor; it is not only extremely important, it is literally true. I’m not saying that
the other is God, but that in his or her Face I hear the Word of God.

Granted that the way in which ‘God reverberates’2 in the Other’s face is an enigmatic
phenomenon beyond our knowing, we are nonetheless commanded and ordained to a relation
of responsibility for the other.3
1

See Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Philosophy, Justice, and Love’ in Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous.

On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York:
Columbia University, 1998), 110.
2

Levinas, ‘Philosophy, Justice and Love,’ 110.

3

Levinas writes: ‘The consciousness of responsibility immediately imposed is certainly not

in the nominative, it is rather in the accusative …. It is in that sense that I can say that
consciousness, subjectivity, no longer have first place in their relationship to the other.’ We
can see here that Levinas gives priority to ethical transcendence or alterity (otherness). In a
Levinasian sense, alterity or otherness refers to being made responsible by the Other to such a
degree that it overwhelms the intentionality of consciousness. As a result, the self is obliged
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Kasper’s religious quest for Jesus Christ takes us on a theological journey that
penetrates the world of secular reason and rationality. The highpoint in this journey is the
affirmation that Jesus is the Christ. This resounding logic, explored in Kasper’s Jesus the
Christ, remains an urgent and defining one for today. Jesus the Christ is a classic, not only in
the field of Christology, but also in Christian theology as a whole. It stands amongst such
classics as Karl Rahner’s Foundations of Christian Faith and Urs von Balthasar’s The Glory
of the Lord.4
Together, Kasper, von Balthasar, and Rahner have enhanced Christian theology
through imagination, creativity, and vision. Whereas, for example, Rahner develops a
theological anthropology, and von Balthasar a theo-logical logic, Kasper develops a logic of
faith in search of a contemporary critical way of speaking of God. Given that von Balthasar
grounds his theology and discourse on truth in theological aesthetics, it might appear that
Kasper’s discussion is deficient, since he may appear to be forgetful of the important
category of the beautiful. Von Balthasar prioritises the philosophical transcendental of beauty
so that we might truly have the eyes of faith to see the glorious form of Christ in the paschal
mystery and the Trinity. Kasper’s contribution, however, is equally appealing. He articulates

to sacrifice itself to the point of expiation for the Other. See Levinas, ‘Philosophy, Justice and
Love,’ 111.
4

Indicating and acknowledging the contribution of Raher and von Balthasar, Kasper writes:

‘In German-speaking theology, it was Karl Rahner and Has Urs von Balthasar above all who
set the standard for the break-through in our century; and this was so even though their ways
were later to part to some degree – or perhaps for that very reason’ (Walter Kasper, Theology
and Church [New York: Crossroad, 1989], 1).
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the quest for the person of Christ with a logic and rationale that uncovers the inner truth of
human existence and freedom.
We might ask what drives Kasper to develop a logic of faith and salvation that
touches the heart of human history, freedom, and existence. It is faith and hope in the word of
salvation that Jesus is the Christ. Whereas von Balthasar underlines, dramatically, the sense
of Christ’s mission being one with his person in God and as God, Kasper reflects upon the
quest for Jesus the Christ with a contemporary, historical, and personal urgency that
underscores a salvific and kerygmatic concern for our present human condition.
Kasper diagnoses a critical crisis in secular society. Having fallen into relativism and
an understanding of the world that is centred on subjectivity, society has created egoistically
an idol, namely, its self as the measure of all things. Experience, freedom, and history are but
modes of being-for-oneself. Wary of the enlightenment’s self-certainty and its ultimate fall
into irrationality, Kasper brings to light the very truth that Jesus is the Christ. To this end, he
connects Christology to soteriology. He utilises, furthermore, the language of ontology and
phenomenology, adding to them aspects of existentialism. Such an approach, in some
respects, bears a resemblance to Heidegger’s Being and Time. Kasper, however, inverts or revisions Heidegger’s search for the meaning of being by translating it from a secular context
into one of faith. Whereas Heidegger may be read as secularizing theology in Being and
Time, Kasper is concerned with not reducing theology to a particular philosophical system,
but in raising philosophical and theological discourse to a new search for truth, that takes the
secularised world as his point of departure.
Kasper’s ‘Religious Quest of Jesus Christ’ is a journey towards the wisdom of faith.
In wholly different terms, Levinas searches for an idea of God beyond being and
thematization, that is, for the possibility of pronouncing the word God beyond, what he sees
as, the betrayal that accompanies ontological statement. Levinas emphasises also that

4

‘philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service of love.’5 At this juncture Kasper and
Levinas may be together at a crossroads. Given that the movement from philosophy to
theology is borne by understanding and faith, we can affirm that for Kasper ‘theology is the
wisdom of love at the service of love.’ In a statement, for example, that appears to draw upon
the locus of alterity, Kasper states: ‘The Christian freedom which perfects human freedom
can even less be individualistically interpreted. It is freedom which proves itself in love (Gal
5.13), a freedom which does not consist in being-in-itself or being-for-itself, but in being-forothers.’6
Kasper’s philosophical-theological writings express a faith in search of wisdom, love,
and service. Moreover, his message testifies to an unveiling of the human person before God:
that our being (existence) and our experience (consciousness, emotions, perceptions, and
desires) find fulfilment in self-transcendence, a state in which we find hope and ultimate
meaning in Jesus the Christ. In mapping out his quest, Kasper considers the logic of faith
with respect to four areas of the modern world’s own quest for meaning: a secularised world,
demythologisation, anthropology, and finally history.

The Challenge from a Secularised world

Kasper’s theology of ‘the Religious Quest for Jesus Christ’ begins with a
programmatic and compelling statement of faith: ‘The confession that “Jesus is the Christ” is
the answer to the question of salvation and redemption.’7 This is the whole theological logic
5

Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis

(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University, 1999), 162.
6

See Kasper, Theology and Church, 69-70.

7

Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (London: Burns & Oates, 1977), 41.
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that underlines the religious quest for Jesus Christ in a secularised world. Immediately, we
note a kerygmatic concern that takes to heart the fundamental question from Matthew’s
gospel: ‘Are you the one who is to come, or shall we look for another?’ (Matt 11:3).
Underlying Kasper’s approach is a challenge to Rahner’s anthropological turn to the subject,
and particularly, to his emphasis on an implicit assent of faith in the idea of ‘anonymous
Christianity.’ We can see Kasper’s concern that such an embryonic assent of faith might not
only be reductive, but also skewed in its anthropology. If God is indeed personal, then it is a
personal ‘yes’ in faith that is the only appropriate response to him.
The aim of Kasper’s philosophical-theological work is to present a logic of faith that
is not only comprehensible to the modern secular mindset, but acts as a bridge to the world of
self-transcendence and to life in Christ.8 Hence, it is not surprising that he presents his
position with a framework that is typical of the enlightenment mind-set, namely, that of
question and answer: ‘The confession that “Jesus is the Christ” is the answer to the question
of salvation and redemption.’9 This framework does, however, raise the issue of whether
Kasper himself runs the risk of falling into an enlightenment reduction. Furthermore, from a

8

For Levinas the thought of God ought to be included in philosophical discourse.

‘Philosophical discourse … should be able to include God – of whom the Bible speaks – if
this God does have a meaning … the God of the Bible signifies the beyond being,
transcendence’ (Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. by Adriaan T.
Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1996], 130). For Levinas, the God of the Bible has a meaning for philosophy, namely,
transcendence.
9

Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 41.
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post-metaphysical perspective, the challenge is to ensure that ‘being’ is not forgetful of the
theological modes of truth, such as peace, justice, mercy, kenosis, expiation, and humility.10
We may, no doubt, discover limitations in Kasper’s quest, but let us first examine
what he has to offer. We will find that he sets out to re-think the enlightenment, and in doing
so demythologise its very limitations. Whilst he may share some of the concerns of the
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory with its project of testing the principles of the
enlightenment, Kasper is, nonetheless, concerned primarily with the quest of witnessing to
Christ today. This concern reflects experience in the sense of being a journey and a
progressive learning. In Kasper’s writing experience is constantly directed by theological
truth.
Kasper’s concern is first and foremost theo-logical. He analyses and challenges the
secular world to be more mindful of ‘a Christian and religious emphasis.’11 He constructs, to
borrow von Balthasar’s terminology, a ‘theo-logic,’ that is, an articulation of his own
perspective, which is to rationally testify to the Word/word of God in a secular world.

Man wants to assess the world and treat it in a worldly way. He wants to reach a
rational insight into the immanent objective structures of politics, economics, science,
and so on, and to orientate his activity accordingly. The ‘absolute’ and ultimate
questions which cannot be solved in this way are largely counted as meaningless and
10

I am taking here a Levinasian perspective, in which to have a sense in being one is required

to be otherwise than being. For a description of Levinas’ complex and ambiguous
understanding of ‘having a sense, ’ see Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 64, 122-123
and Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University, 1999), 16, 49, 108, 144-162.
11

Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 41.
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as best set aside in favour of the soluble problems which – so it is claimed – accord
with actual needs.12

Kasper’s critique of society defines the concerns of our post-modern condition in which we
so easily lose ourselves both in relativism and in a naïve and reductive rationalism. In such a
context the search for the transcendent has been more or less abandoned in favour of other
more ‘meaningful’ this-worldly (secular) pursuits, such as those of economics and science.
Kasper’s concern is to awaken, or even surprise, the secularised world, through rational
argument, to its real meaning and truth (the very Logos of God). When humanity assesses
and treats the world from within its own parameters, the tyranny and ‘bad faith’ of public
opinion clouds the religious quest. We can, as a result, become forgetful of one another’s
needs and fears, and subservient to both a depersonalised existence and a reality that has
become absurd for us.
In Levinasian terms this could be characterised as an ‘existence without existents.’13
In describing being in terms of fear and horror, as an anonymous and depersonalised state of
existence, Levinas’ phrase, there is (il y a), connotes this ‘existence without existents.’14 As
the horror that strips consciousness of its subjectivity, the there is depicts a frightening
ambiguity: the inability to ascertain the presence or absence of anything.15 Metaphorically, he

12

Ibid., 41.

13

Emmanel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (London: Kluwer

Academic, 1995), 57. ‘Existence without existents’ refers also to the experience of existence
before taking up any position in life.
14

Ibid.

15

Ibid., 64.
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aptly describes the experience of the there is as the horror of the night.16 Appropriating
Levinas’ analysis of the there is, we could suggest that Kasper’s quest is a religious one that
ultimately demands that we be vigilant against the tendency to ground human freedom in
positions (such as secularism, ideology, utopian ideals, etc) that will ultimately alienate the
human person from existence.
Kasper diagnoses the world’s fundamental problem by means of the category of
subjectivity, or more accurately, egoistical subjectivity: ‘Subjectivity means that man posits
himself as the starting-point and measure for understanding reality as a whole.’17 This, for
Kasper, represents a reduction of divine being to human being. In general, he observes, there
is a tendency in society to reduce the other (person) to one’s own perceptions, desires, and
needs, without reference to any transcendent truth. To avoid the vicious circle of egoism is
the hope that is offered by salvation. For Kasper such exclusive subjectivity leads ultimately
to an objectivity (knowledge) in which science and technology are the dominant voices. This
is to leave reason without the support of faith, and a series of unsolved problems without an
appreciation of the legitimate place of mystery.
To present the world as a problem to be completely solved is already to deny the
place, and importance, of mystery. ‘Man believes that he is in the process of increasingly
understanding the real causes of things, and that he is coming more and more to master and
control them.’18 We can see that Kasper is wary of humanity’s arrogance in presuming
absolute power over the world and things. The paradox is that the more powerful we become,
the more powerless we actually are, as we refrain from defining ourselves in terms of

16

Ibid., 62.

17

Ibid., 42.

18

Ibid.
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mystery. Thus, we can begin to understand and appreciate Kasper’s critique of subjectivity
and its accompanying reductionism.
As a means of articulating the Christ event, Kasper favours the category of
emancipation as opposed to subjectivity. Over against Bernard Lonergan’s observation that
‘genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity,’19 Kasper’s perspective on
subjectivity appears rather negative. Presently, moreover, many Christian theologians find
Emmanuel Levinas’ emphasis on ethical subjectivity to be of significant import, in that it
releases the subject from being defined by means of an anonymous and depersonalising
objectivity (in the form of knowledge and self-interest). Levinas aims at an ethical
subjectivity that is beyond any form of philosophical objectivity. Truth does not depend on
objectivity and the meaning of being in general, since it is now much more a testimony of
responsibility for the other, which goes beyond the conatus (effort) of philosophical
intelligence.20 Nonetheless, Kasper’s logic is important since it takes us along his quest from
(egoistic) subjectivity towards emancipation, so that we might take the next important step,
namely, to the category of redemption.
Kasper observes that ‘it is a fundamental question for modern Christology to decide
the relation between redemption understood in a Christian perspective and emancipation
understood as the modern age understands it.’21 We are faced with two competing categories:
the theological category of redemption and the historico-philosophical category of
emancipation. The question then is how we can make the religious category of redemption
comprehensible, given the historical, political, economic and social conditioning that is
19

See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto,

1996), 292.
20

See Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, 102-103.

21

Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 43.

10

associated with the category of emancipation. In contrast to Bultmann’s and Rahner’s
previous attempts, Kasper sets out to transpose the category of emancipation for theology,
and hence give it a religious foundation for a secularised world.

The Demythologization of Belief in Christ

According to Kasper, secular thought tends to demythologise Christian faith and its
mysteries in a destructive way by presenting the content of faith as mythological and
uninspiring for today. In effect, secular thought severs Christian faith from the discourse on
truth in the name of purifying human reason from ‘mythic’ conceptions.

When human freedom and maturity become the dominant midpoint and criterion of
thought, traditional religious ideas and convictions must appear mythological. The
traditional faith in Jesus Christ has also incurred the suspicion of being mythological.
… Surely, out of intellectual honesty and for the sake of a more genuine idea of God,
we have to demythologise the whole thing?22

Deconstructing and inverting the secular position, Kasper demythologises such secular logic
so as to create a complementary discourse on meaning, in which faith in Jesus the Christ is
articulated in the name of reason. If secular society’s intent is to portray the Christian God as
‘primitive,’ ‘out-of-date,’ and as a cosmic ‘gap-filler,’ we might well understand Kasper’s
concern in re-orientating Christian hermeneutics so that it is attentive to the danger of such

22

Ibid.
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negative demythologising, that interprets Christianity exclusively from within the categories
of myth and mythology. 23
The governing idea behind the demythologisation project, however, is not one of
elimination, but of interpretation. The aim is to discover the meaning of the objective core of
the event — ‘to reveal the lasting content and intention in a way appropriate to the modern
mind.’24 But how ‘appropriate’ is this process, when a negative rationalization accompanies
it? Given this problem, Kasper broadens the picture, observing that the roots of the
demythologisation process are to be found in the context of humanity renewing its
understanding of being (in the modes of existence and reality).

The Meaning of Being

Although Kasper does not deal specifically with the issue, we can see a development
in the modern mind in its understanding of the meaning of being. By means of existentialism,
anthropology, and ontological phenomenology, the modern mind has acquired the tools to

23

Kasper defines myth as ‘the form of understanding proper to an out-of-date epoch of

human history: the primitive era, or childhood, or mankind. In that epoch, man was not aware
of the real causes of things, and therefore he saw supramundane and divine powers at work
everywhere in the world an in history.’ Furthermore, according to Kasper, mythology is ‘the
mode of thought and imagination which understands the divine in a worldly form, and the
worldly in a divine form. God is the gap-filler, the dues ex machine, who replaces natural
causes with miraculous and supernatural interventions. . . . The divine . . . can be experienced
everywhere and directly in everything’ (Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 44).
24

Ibid.
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comprehend in new categories being’s modality of existence. This creates, additionally, a
useful lens for interpreting various Christological developments since the enlightenment.
We have, for example, a new framework for understanding the debate over the
distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. This debate may be seen as
situated within a movement of understanding the meaning of being in terms of reality (the
Jesus of history) and in terms of existence (the Christ of faith). The search for the meaning of
being, carried through by thinkers such as D.F. Strauss and Albert Schweitzer, embraced the
significance of reality (as we find in the eighteenth and nineteenth century quest for the
historical Jesus). On the one hand, the search continued and evolved towards another aspect
of being, namely, existence. Twentieth century theologians like Bultmann embraced the
significance of existence so as to free the Christ of faith from false kerygmatic realities,
which mythologise the Jesus of history. For Bultmann, the redemptive event was not a
supernatural event, but a purely historical one.
Against this framework of Christological development since the enlightenment in the
search for the meaning of being, we may ask about the significance of Kasper’s Christology.
Even though he points out, acknowledging Bultmann’s contribution, that ‘the
demythologisation programme tries to accord with man’s changed understanding of reality,’25
he also insists that a major concern of the demythologisation programme is that of
understanding existence. Hence, it is not surprising that Kasper finds himself part of the very
movement from reality to existence, as he reflects on Jesus Christ’s definitive interplay
within human existence:

Demythologisation is also acceptable in its positive aspect, as, that is to say,
existential or anthropological interpretation. Revelation uses human language, which
25

Ibid.
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only reveals something when it reaches the hearer: when, that is, he understands it.
Furthermore, in Jesus Christ human existence as a whole becomes the ‘grammar’ of
God’s self-expression.26

Whilst Bultmann minimizes Christ’s historical kerygma and presence, for Kasper,
God communicates the truth of revelation through the life, death, and risen presence of Jesus
Christ. It is interesting that Kasper acknowledges the problem of language and touches on the
post-modern concern of meaning and language. ‘We have to ask whether and how far
theological discourse and discussion are really possible and meaningful.’27 Since the late
twentieth century, the demythologisation program has begun to revise the category of being,
as we find eminent Christian theologians such as David Ford, Michael Barnes, and Michael
Purcell taking an interest in Emmanuel Levinas’ conception of ‘otherwise than Being or
beyond essence.’ 28 In many respects, the philosophical writings of Emmanuel Levinas
attempt to demythologise the Heideggerian conception of being. Levinas writes at the
beginning of his work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, ‘to hear a God not
contaminated by Being is a human possibility no less important and no less precarious than to
bring Being out of the oblivion in which it is said to have fallen in metaphysics and in ontotheology.’29
26

Ibid., 46.

27

Ibid., 46.

28

David Ford, Self and Salvation: Being Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University,

1999); Michael Barnes, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); and Michael Purcell, Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner and
Levinas (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1998).
29

See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, xlviii.
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Kasper’s theology is situated at a turning point between the enlightenment and a new
post-modern era that pushes metaphysics toward a new understanding of the logos (the truth
of being), where existence is understood primarily from the ethical point of view. The postmodern ethic suggests that the more responsibility a person undertakes, paradoxically, the
more is required of that person. Ultimately, we are called to be like God, that is, to take on a
‘difficult freedom,’ where we are responsible for everything and everyone. In Levinasian
terms, this difficult freedom is one of superindividuation and of a hyperbolic responsibility.
Through this ‘individuation or superindividuation’ the self undergoes a certain fusion of
identity with the suffering reality of the other. Levinas states cryptically: ‘I am an Other.’30
Kasper’s theology of the quest for Jesus Christ is a necessary stepping stone and
reminder for post-modern theology to keep to the truth that Jesus is the Christ. He underlines
the urgency of the task of appropriate demythologization: ‘The biblical and church doctrine
that Jesus was a true and complete man with a human intellect and human freedom, does not
seem to prevail in the average Christian head.’31 We find him, thus stating, that
‘demythologisation is not only permissible but necessary; precisely in order to disclose the
authentic meaning of belief in Christ.’32 Accordingly, for Kasper, the task of preaching,
teaching, and witnessing to the truth of Jesus Christ to the world is of prime importance for
post-modern theology.
Examining Kasper’s reflection on demythologisation, we see the importance of the
positive ‘existential or anthropological interpretation.’ In more manageable terms, he touches
on von Balthasar’s idea of Jesus Christ as the analogy of being par excellence, that is, Christ
as the defining archetype in discovering our similarity with, and ever greater dissimilarity
30

Ibid., 118.

31

Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 46.

32

Ibid.
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from, God or divine being. For Kasper, Christological statements tell us about human
existence. But such theological statements always run the risk of falling into impersonal
representations, proofs, and debates.

The Risks of Theological Discourse

Kasper sets out on a religious-theological quest to discover how God relates to
humanity, and how the world might reveal God. In this a fundamental question is raised on
the viability of theological discourse. ‘We have to ask whether and how far theological
discourse and discussion are really possible and meaningful.’33 This is a vital question for
which there is no ultimate answer – it is the same as asking: ‘What is the meaning of being?’
At once, Kasper’s religious quest is a search for a rational way of articulating God, whilst
acknowledging the importance of transcendence and mystery.34
In the quest for a logic of faith, Kasper describes the problems encountered by the
‘emancipation, enlightenment and demythologisation movement of recent years,’35 such as
33

Ibid.

34

Levinas seeks also to explore the logos of God without thematizing God’s divinity. He

speaks of the rather enigmatic idea of illeity to express how God commands the self in order
to testify to his glory. In this sense theological language could be described as the gift of self
for the other, that is in Levinasian terms, the un-thematizable sign of God’s trace (illeity),
which orders and commands the self to a life of responsibility for the other. In such ethical
transcendence, the self does not succumb to the temptation of consciousness to betray the
divine word. This is because the gift of one’s soul (marked by God’s trace) coincides with
sacrifice for the other. See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 79, 147, 151, 162.
35

Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 47.
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the realization of the Frankfurt School that the enlightenment itself ‘ran the risk of
succumbing to irrationalism by itself becoming irrational.’ 36 This too is a risk in Kasper’s
theology, as he continues with his question and answer methodology. It is more accentuated
in particular areas of his theology.
Kasper falls into such a philosophising reductionism, when, for example, he
emphasises that, ‘this “sym-pathetic” God as he reveals himself in Jesus Christ is the
definitive answer to the question of theodicy.’37 For Kasper, God redeems suffering, removes
its weakness, and transforms it into hope. Kenosis and suffering are not the last words; it is
Christ’s Easter exaltation and transfiguration, which is effected in the world through the work
of the Spirit. There is a danger here of reducing theology to objective categories, which fall
ultimately into the irrationality of being forgetful of mystery—in the sense of maintaining
that passivity of letting-oneself-be-encountered-by-mystery.
In response to Kasper, I would suggest that it is a personal relationship of faithfulness
to Christ amidst suffering that offers what is more a resolution than an answer to the question
of theodicy. We cannot ultimately put our faith in answers, but rather in the divine person of
Jesus Christ. Moreover, the person of Christ is more than an answer; Christ is a divine person
who is beyond proofs, demonstrations, and explanations. We need to question any theodicy
that is founded merely on logical proofs. Levinas has commented that ‘the disproportion
between suffering and every theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with a glaring, obvious
clarity.’38 Beyond any answers to the question of human suffering and the existence of God,
Levinas observes: ‘Auschwitz would paradoxically entail a revelation from the very God who
36

Ibid., 47.

37

See Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (London: SCM,

1984), 197.
38

Levinas, ‘Useless Suffering,’ in Levinas, Entre Nous, 97.
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nevertheless was silent at Auschwitz: a commandment of faithfulness.’39 In a programmatic
work reflecting on ‘The Time of Redemption and the Time of Justice,’ and bringing together
the mysteries of time and the other, he writes:

What produces the thrust of hope is the gravity of the instant in which it occurs. The
irreparable is its natural atmosphere. There is hope only when hope is longer
permissible. What is irreparable in the instant of hope is that that instant is a present.
The future can bring consolation or compensation to a subject who suffers in the
present, but the very suffering of the present remains like a cry whose echo will
resound forever in the eternity of spaces.40

Levinas wrote this not long after the Second World War. This language of hope is a
commanding response of faith not only to his time of captivity in a German stalag,41 but also
39

Ibid., 99.

40

Levinas. Existence and Existents, 89-90.

41

Against his experience of being regarded as a name-less non-existent while in captivity,

Levinas laments: ‘In horror a subject is stripped of his subjectivity, of his power to have
private existence. The subject is depersonalised. ‘Nausea,’ as a feeling for existence, is not
yet a depersonalisation; but horror turns the subjectivity of the subject, his particularity qua
entity, inside out. It is a participation in the there is which returns in the heart of every
negation, in the there is that has ‘no exits.’ It is, if we may say so, the impossibility of death,
the universality of existence even in its annihilation’ (Levinas, Existence and Existents, 61).
See also Levinas’ essay, ‘The Name of A Dog, or Natural Rights’ in Emmanuel Levinas,
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. by Seán Hand (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University, 1990), 151-153.
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to Heidegger’s stance in the face of National Socialism.42 Ultimately it reflects Levinas’s
intention of waiting on the good (salvation, mercy, and justice) in the face of evil of
suffering.43
Perhaps Kasper is not so far removed from Levinas’ attempt to forge a language of
hope and faith in so far as he too is determined to wait on the good amidst an increasingly
secularised world.44 For Kasper, the enlightenment principle that human reason is the
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Levinas writes: ‘We know what Heidegger was in 1933, even if he was so during a brief

period, and even if his disciples – many of who are estimable – forget about it. For me, it is
unforgettable. One could have been everything except Hitlerian, even if it was inadvertent’
(Emmauel Levinas, Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jill
Robbins [Stanford CA: Stanford University, 2001], 94). Caputo, who uses Levinas’ writings
to demythologise Heidegger’ thought, points out: ‘What Heidegger regards as the inner truth
of the spiritual relationship of Greek and German, which in 1933 is Heidegger’s attempt both
to elevate Nazi mythology to the level of metaphysics and to give a deeper, spiritual mooring
to the revolution, is a “truth” that Heidegger never renounced’ (John D. Caputo,
Demythologizing Heidegger (Indianapolis: Indiana University, 1993), 5).
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Reflecting a biblical sense of hope, Kasper writes, in a later exposition that deals with

theodicy: ‘Theodicy and anthropodicy require that the conflict between truth and falsehood,
justice and injustice be resolved and that absolute justice be established. In a word: there must
be an end to all nonsense. It is the fulfilment of this very basic hope that is meant when
scripture talks in apocalyptic language about the Lord in the end destroying his adversary,
who refuses to acknowledge God’s holiness and shows nothing but contempt for human
dignity’ (Walter Kasper, ‘Individual Salvation and Eschatological Consummation,’ in
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measure of all things ultimately ends in abandoning ‘the idea of a specific history of
salvation.’45 As a result, Christology is reduced to anthropology. The danger here affects all
theology as it can become a victim of its own logic and language. Kasper’s contribution is
more telling in his transposition of the enlightenment-inspired conception of emancipation to
the theological context of redemption. The enlightenment gave ultimate value to human
dignity and freedom. Kasper challenges such a notion of freedom: ‘But surely then the
enlightenment tradition, which denies God in the name of liberty, contradicts itself in the end.
How can we conceive reality as existing under the primacy of freedom without a universal
guarantee of divine freedom?’46 So we see how enlightenment logic can end in the irrational,
when it denies the possibility of the logic of faith. Even though Kasper can also fall victim to
this irrationality, as we have seen, he is correct in suggesting that there is a need for a second
enlightenment, a phenomenon that is in its birth pangs today.
Kasper’s religious quest for Jesus Christ has warned us of the temptation of reducing
Jesus of Nazareth to a man mythologised. Just as von Balthasar carefully distinguished
between a theological aesthetics and an aesthetical theology, Kasper, in a perhaps more
confrontational tone warns of an anthropological Christology. Let us now examine how he
discusses Christology in relation to anthropology.

Christology with an Anthropological Emphasis

Surprisingly, Kasper begins by praising Rahner’s ‘Christology from below’:
Raymond Brown, S.S., Walter Kasper and Gerald O’Collins, S.J., Faith and the Future:
Studies in Christian Eschatology (New York: Paulist, 1994), 17-18.
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Karl Rahner has done us an immense service in showing how Christology can be
pursued in a new way on the presuppositions (not the conditions) of the modern
movement. He has opened a new road to Christian belief for a great number of people
and has established a bridgehead between Catholic theology and the hermeneutical
discussion of recent years.47

This ‘new way’ engages the subject (in its autonomy), whilst at the same time advocating ‘a
non-mythological understanding of Christ.’ 48 Jesus’ humanity is presented as both the
revelation of God and of the human condition. Although Kasper seems to complement
Rahner’s analysis, one ought to be careful in taking such praise at face value.
The fact is that Kasper engages in quite a sophisticated deconstruction of Rahner’s
transcendental Christology. To this end, he critiques Rahner in three areas: (i) the experience
of the infinite as the ground of finite freedom and existence; (ii) the experience of fulfilment
as mediated through history and, in particular, through the salvific-historical event of
redemption; (iii) transcendence as a dimension to our existence that is continually on the way
to the revelation of God’s self-communication.
Rahner’s understanding of human transcendence may be inspiring, but, for Kasper, it
is reductive. Rahner’s transcendental Christology is a ‘self-transcendent Christology’ to the
extent of representing ‘the unique fulfilment of anthropology.’49 In other words, when
persons go beyond themselves in experiencing a true Christ-like nature, they experience the
meaning of their being. Such a position grounds Rahner’s notion of the anonymous Christian
47

Ibid.

48
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Ibid., 49.
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in the sense that for every fulfilling experience of human life there is an ‘implicit acceptance’
of the Son of Man.50
In spite of Rahner’s logical analysis, the critical questions of human ‘being’ in the
world have not been answered. ‘We have to ask whether, if we adopt so anthropologically
oriented a theology and Christology, we are not unilaterally “metaphysicizing” historical
Christianity, and cancelling by philosophical speculation the scandal of its specific
reference.’51 This could suggest that Kasper is ultimately suspicious of Rahner’s tendency to
ground theology, not only in anthropology, but also in metaphysics. In a later analysis of
kenosis-Christology in The God of Jesus Christ, he remarks:

But the attempt to understand God and Jesus Christ in terms of the kenosis idea must
be antecedently aware that such an understanding must not turn into a wisdom of this
world but must hold fast to the folly of the message of the cross, which is the wisdom
of God (cf. I Cor 1:18-31). The point of departure for such an attempt can therefore
only be the testimony of the Bible and not some philosophy or other, whether
classical metaphysics with its apathia-axiom, or idealism with its conception of the
necessary self-renunciation of the absolute, or modern process philosophy. We must
therefore resist all attempts, anticipated long ago in gnosticism, to turn the cross of
Christ into a world principle, a world law or a world formula or to explain it as a
symbol of the universal principle of ‘dying and living again.’52
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Kasper’s initial praise is, now, a lament. The passage highlights that Kasper is not only
critical of transcendental anthropology, but also of such philosophies, as classical
metaphysics, idealism, and modern process philosophy. Nonetheless, in questioning Rahner’s
metaphysics, Kasper does not succumb to the danger of falling into an anthropologicalcentred Christology, whereby the cross of Christ is misrepresented as a ‘world principle,’
rather than the true reality of Christ’s suffering out of love for us.
Whilst Rahner focuses on the fundamental experience of our human condition in the
world, Kasper is perhaps more attentive to the limits of human consciousness and
understanding. Such limits define our human existence in relation to absolute mystery. We
must face our limits and embrace the mystery of the cross, the very folly of God’s secret and
hidden wisdom (1 Cor 2:7).
Kasper may even go as far as questioning Rahner’s theological integrity: ‘This
constitutive tension between historical reality and transcendental possibility discloses the
basic problem of Rahner’s approach. We might put it in thesis form by saying that Rahner’s
approach is still largely within the bounds of the idealistic philosophy of identity and its
identification of being and consciousness.’53 Is Kasper suggesting that we have in Rahner’s
reasoning a pantheistic, rather than a panentheistic, system? Is it really justifiable for him to
state that Rahner is forgetful of the transcendental conditions of knowing and unknowing?54
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For his part, Rahner is aware of the structure of knowledge, that is, the conditions of

knowing and unknowing. In a text on the knowledge and self-consciousness of Christ,
Rahner writes: ‘In preparing for our reflections proper, it should be stated first of all that
knowledge has a multi-layered structure: this means that it is absolutely possible that in
relation to these dimensions of consciousness and knowledge something may be known and
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According to Kasper, Rahner is forgetful of this structure of knowledge since he focuses
more on the development of knowledge (its reality as one of becoming) than on its existential
ground in mystery and enigma (where the truth of human existence converges in Christ).55 It
seems, in Kasper’s mind, that Rahner has fallen into the temptation of confusing human
consciousness with divine being or human being with divine consciousness.56 This tells us
that, for Kasper, the quest for the meaning of being does not depend first on redeeming
anthropology, but on the proclamation of faith that Jesus is the Christ.
It would appear that Kasper’s religious quest for Jesus Christ takes a detour to include
a demythologizing of Rahner’s theology. Following from this, we find that Kasper
emphasises human response and human relations over against Rahner’s emphasis on the
human person as a question. Despite his later writings, which examine the experience of
transcendence in history in relation to language, Rahner appears, nevertheless (at least in

not known at the same time’ (Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4, Later Writings,
translated by Karl Kruger [London: DLT, 1966], 199).
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In more enigmatic terms, Levinas states: ‘To be or not to be is not the question where

transcendence is concerned. The statement of being’s other, or the otherwise than being,
claims to state a difference over and beyond that which separates being from nothingness –
the very difference of the beyond, the difference of transcendence’ (Levinas, Otherwise than
Being, 3). Hence, in order to have a true sense of being, we must be otherwise than being,
that is, we must turn go beyond the pursuit of the everyday consciousness of caring for
oneself and one’s possibilities. The very ethical transcendence of care for the other leads us to
a just sense in being, and hence, to the possibility of uttering the word God in love and
mercy.
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Kasper’s mind), to be forgetful of the key transcendental conditions of our relating with God
in history, namely, the limitations of human consciousness and understanding.
As noted, Kasper sees in Rahner the problems associated with idealism, in which, for
example, being (God’s being and our being) is over-identified with the categories of
consciousness, that is to say, God’s divinity is not distinguished clearly enough from our
humanity. This in turn contributes to the aforementioned anthropological reduction. ‘Is it
really possible for him [man] as a finite being to conceive the infinite?’57 We have here the
perennial philosophical question of the meaning of being, for which there is no ultimate
answer.58
For his part, Kasper acknowledges the problem involved in understanding divine
consciousness and being: ‘What that infinite really is remains open, ambiguous and
ambivalent. It can be interpreted in numberless ways.’59 We are ultimately left with the fact
that we too are an image and likeness of God, that is, we too are ‘an impenetrable mystery.’
This suggests that we cannot know in complete identity either God or human being. In
Levinasian terms, this is expressed in the alterity, or otherness, which we encounter in the
disturbing proximity of our neighbour.60 Here the word of God in the other’s face disturbs us
57
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realizing a transcendent truth in being, namely, peace, justice and mercy (Levinas, Otherwise
than Being, 16).
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a disturbance of the rememberable time. One can call that apocalyptically the break-up of
time. But it is a matter of an effaced but untameable diachrony of non-historical, non-said
time, which cannot by synchronized in a present by memory and historiography, where the
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as it imposes on the self an unheard-of responsibility, to the point even of overwhelming
self’s consciousness in the demands placed on it. Levinas will describe this overwhelming
effect in such dramatic terms as trauma, persecution, and that of being held hostage by the
other.61
Acknowledging, finally, the aporia, namely, the problem that cannot be solved, but
only resolved, Kasper clarifies: ‘The main lines of man’s real nature cannot be produced until
they reach a certain point called Jesus Christ. … Man has to acknowledge that in Jesus Christ
everything which he hopes for is indeed fulfilled, but in an ultimately underivable way.’62
Jesus Christ is the resolution of the unsolvable problem of our day. The enlightenment’s
confidence that ‘all problems can be solved,’ leads to an irrational position, which Kasper
sees resolved in Jesus Christ.
It should be pointed out, of course, that Rahner is aware of the reduction of being to
consciousness in his Christology. Reflecting on Christology, he warns: ‘To avoid
misunderstanding, we must note that the Christology outlined above [of the Incarnation and
God’s relation to the world] is not a “Christology of consciousness” in contrast to an
ontological Christology affirming the substantial unity of the Logos with his human nature. It
is based on the metaphysical insight, derived from a strict ontology, that true being is the
spirit as such itself.’63 Nevertheless, Kasper’s suspicions of Rahner’s Christology are not
present is but the trace of an immemorial past. The obligation aroused by the proximity of the
neighbour is not to the measure of the images he gives me; it concerns me before or
otherwise. Such is the sense of the non-phenomenality of the face’ (Levinas, Otherwise Than
Being, 89).
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without foundation. Moreover, even though Rahner speaks of the danger of mythologizing
truth, his Christology contains elements of process philosophy / theology. He describes Christ
as ‘this God-becoming-man’ in such terms as to introduce change into the reality of God, that
is, in terms of human nature.64 Kasper’s criticism of Rahner marks a tendency in Rahner’s
Christology to give priority to the anthropological reality of the Incarnation over against the
very personal and relational existence of the Incarnate Logos, and, derivatively, on our part,
to a personal response to Christ.

The Analogy of Being

In the religious quest for Jesus Christ, Kasper underlines the importance of the very
assent of faith, that is not just implicit: ‘Man has to acknowledge that in Jesus Christ
everything which he hopes for is indeed fulfilled.’65 The ‘has to,’ muß in the original text,
implies an ultimate responsibility for accepting faith in Christ. Hence, against Rahner, Kasper
highlights a new relationship between Christology and anthropology: one that uses the logic
of the analogy of being (analogia entis), namely, that for every similarity between God and
the human person, there is a greater dissimilarity. ‘In the sense of the classical notion of
analogy, we have to say that however great the similarity between anthropology and
Christology, the dissimilarity is still greater.’66 We thus find that the analogy of being gives a
structure to the relationship between anthropology and Christology. This is not new, as von
Balthasar has already presented this very issue in his trilogy on aesthetics, dramatics, and
logic.
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Kasper goes further, stating that ‘anthropology is so to speak the grammar which God
uses to express himself. But the grammar as such is still available for a great number of
pronouncements. It is concretely decided only through the actual human life of Jesus.’ 67
Accordingly, we have the important statement of faith that Christ is the analogia entis par
excellence. As pointed out, this is the same position held by von Balthasar. Christ, as the
ultimate analogy of being, is the one in whom we find the meaning and truth of our human
existence. This might suggest that Rahner’s Christology is forgetful of the Christological
implications of the analogy of being.
It is now not unexpected that Kasper favours the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,
a theologian whose influence no doubt permeates his thought. With von Balthasar, Kasper
introduces the category of the ‘New’ in the sense that we cannot limit the event of Jesus
Christ to a specific time in history. The Christ event cannot be limited to just one instance in
time or to one meaning; in fact its meaning permeates all time and every human heart. Its
meaning is dependent on (divine) being, rather than on human knowledge. We can begin to
see things as truly historical when we realise that, like Mary, we too can have a share in
Christ’s mission and life, and realise that the quest for salvation is an important source of
meaning and truth for us.68

The Quest for Salvation in an Historicized World

In the spirit of Vatican II, Kasper analyses the transition in Catholic theology from
having a static view of reality towards having a more dynamic and evolutionary one. The
danger of the quest for Jesus Christ today is that of falling into a search for a ‘temporal well
67

Ibid.

68

Ibid., 51-2.

28

being which we ourselves plan, organise, devise and fight for.’69 Such a quest for human
well-being has indeed taken a hedonistic and narcissistic turn with the increasing wealth of
society. In contrast, a philosophical and theological quest for the absolute (for redemption
and salvation) goes deeper in the search for meaning and truth.70 From a Levinasian
perspective, however, I would argue that God does not have to safeguard the truth against a
hedonistic and narcissistic distortion of it. The nature of divine truth is infinite and is
encountered through an extreme passivity that reflects an infinite responsibility before the
other.71
In order to investigate the meaning of Christ’s being for our historical situation,
Kasper begins with the question: ‘What is history?’ 72 He responds: ‘There is history only
where there is freedom.’ 73 Freedom is the human spirit bestowing its meaning on our
existence. Our human spirit develops an ‘inner sense of history and understanding of time,’ 74
that complements external time and history. History is relational, ‘a process of reciprocity
between subject and object,’75 and is the foundation of experience and meaning in the world.
The issue, for Kasper, is how we might continue to speak ‘about God and something absolute
inside that kind of historical framework of thought?’76 Repeatedly we find Kasper searching
for a rational way of speaking of God in relation to history and the secular world. As a
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response to the search for a logic of faith in history, Kasper offers arguments from three
viewpoints: existence, evil, and self-transcendence.

Existence

Kasper emphasises that all our knowledge is in the sphere of the infinite. If we ignore
the infinite we are left only with facts (the facticity of our historical situation) and, hence, live
separated from the truth. Acknowledgement of the infinite offers humanity space for
‘freedom, decision and venture.’77 Humanity is greater than the facts of our historical reality
because of our relationship to God. Granted that the reality of our existence restricts us to the
fact of living in the world (facticity), we, nevertheless, have a chance for freedom because of
our relationship to the infinite. Thus we are caught between power and impotence, grandeur
and poverty, or, transcendence and the limits of facticity.
Examining our existential state, Kasper introduces the theme of suffering. Our
poverty is an experience of suffering. We suffer because we always already have an inkling
of our greatness that is ultimately the possibility of relating to God. The very possibility of
transcendence underlines for us that we can never truly reduce God to the totality of
knowledge. It further points to the human person as an impenetrable mystery. The human
person cannot be grasped or sufficiently explained through an objective knowledge.78
‘Freedom as the transcendental definition or determination of human beings is not something
that is factually “given”. It cannot be objectively established and proved.’79
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‘How is human existence possible in this aporetic historical situation?’80 In such
words, Kasper asks how we are to live in a world in which we cannot find ultimately a
rational answer for our existence. This is the perennial tragedy wherein we must discover
meaning and truth. In its own terms, anthropology cannot give the final word on the meaning
of our existence. But we can find a ‘resolution’ in God who is infinite truth. Kasper’s quest
for the meaning of divine being takes a turn towards the notion of freedom. In a
complementary manner, for Levinas, the way of truth is directed to a life of difficult freedom,
namely, having to take responsibility even in situations of humiliation and persecution.
Levinas will speak, therefore, of a ‘persecuted truth’ in a manner that is distant from the idea
of truth as unconcealedness (Heidegger), or as presence in consciousness. The transcendent
power of truth is experienced in being exposed to the destitution of the other. It is found in
the trace or proximity of God in the other’s face. In this formulation Levinas wishes to
protect God’s transcendence from onto-theological reductions.81

Evil

Kasper’s second viewpoint, in developing a rational way of speaking of God,
highlights the phenomenon of evil as a means to refine his reflection on existence. The
existence of evil is ‘an impenetrable mystery.’82 Philosophies have struggled to respond
adequately to the problem of evil. Equally theology is confronted with the problem of
theodicy, of trying to explain why there is a God and why there is evil. Kasper comments
firstly on the facticity or existence of evil. He notes that evil is part of the being of human
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history and freedom, and, indeed, characterises it as a ‘perversion of being: as the perversion
of the meaning of existence.’83 Next he qualifies it in terms of the reality of being: ‘Evil is
either the humiliation or the violation of man.’84 Hence, if we separate being into the two
categories of existence and reality, we find two modes of evil: (i) evil as a perversion of
existence; and (ii) evil as absolute meaninglessness.85
It is not possible to easily come to terms with the existence and reality of evil.86
Furthermore, even in pitting ourselves against evil and injustice we may be wounded by its
power. Our suffering in the name of justice, for example, can turn into bitterness, hatred, and
revenge. Only the God of redemption can save us. Such faith-inspired knowledge of
redemption means that at the very moment when all might appear to be lost, everything is, in
fact, possible.87 Such hope is beyond the ground of history; it is forged in the meaning of
Christ’s being-for-the-world, namely, in his grace and redemption.88

Self-Transcendence
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a third moment in this phenomenology: evil as hatred of evil. … The experience of evil
would then be also our waiting on the good – the love of God’ (Levinas, Collected
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We now come to the third viewpoint in Kasper’s logic of giving a rational basis for
faith in Jesus Christ. The first two underlined that, given finite existence and evil, history
cannot find fulfilment from within its own parameters. Despite this, however, a new logos is
possible, if we direct ourselves towards the Logos, that is the Father’s Word of salvation in
the person of Jesus Christ: the truth that ‘Jesus is the Christ.’
To arrive at this insight, we have to realize that an individuation, perhaps even a
super-individuation is possible, in which through the ‘phenomenon of self-transcendence’ we
become a new person in Christ. This transformation signifies becoming ‘more’ like Christ,
and, in this, ‘the achievement of a greater fullness of being.’89 We find, thus, the centre of
Kasper’s search for a logic of faith in the dynamic of transcendence. Self-transcendence is an
opening to the infinity of divine being.90 This, in turn, opens the path that leads to hope,
fulfilment, and ultimate meaning beyond the limitations of history.

Conclusion: The Quest for Jesus Christ Today

‘The compelling and convincing aspect of Jesus Christ is that in him both the
greatness and the inadequacy of mankind are accepted, and accepted infinitely. In that sense,
Jesus Christ is the fulfilment of history.’91 This suggests, to Kasper, that in our historicized
world, an ultimate reason can be encountered in the grace of Christ’s salvific love and
acceptance. We can be transformed and so uncover a hope for ultimate meaning in an act of
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faith in the person of Jesus Christ.92 The more we participate with others in becoming like
Christ in humility and solidarity, the more we can experience the truth of our freedom and of
our existence. Our finite condition and the problem of evil are but obstacles to be negotiated
as we move beyond the limits of our own being towards the otherness of divine being. We are
to witness to the wisdom that Jesus is the Christ. In the hope of witnessing to such glory, we
might truly discover ourselves in turning to Jesus Christ and asking: ‘Are you he who is to
come, or shall we look for another? (Mt 11:3).’93
The proclamation that Jesus is the Christ and Son of God is one that needs to be
renewed for those who remain deaf and blind to the possibility of freedom and redemption
through Jesus. Whilst on a philosophical level we may be unable to find the definitive answer
to the question of the meaning of being, we may, on a theological level, begin to discern a
response to the above question from Matthew’s gospel in the realization that Jesus is the
Christ. At the end of modernity, Kasper has opened a new path for us in responding in faith.

Glenn Morrison lectures in Pastoral and Systematic Theology and is Undergraduate
Coordinator in Theology at The University of Notre Dame Australia. His research interests
include the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, postmodern theology, pastoral theology, and
mental health. Address: School of Philosophy and Theology, The University of Notre Dame
Australia, PO Box 1225, Fremantle, WA, Australia, 6959. gmorrison@nd.edu.au

92

‘It is only when someone, in the act of faith, gives himself up to the encounter with God

and his revelation that these make an impact on him, and for him become salvation’ (Kasper,
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